I therefore read it focusing on three aspects: 1. What is the primary message of the text? 2. What is its theoretical set-up, the framework of the argument? 3. How are the theses developed and substantiated?
In fact, there seem to be three messages. The main message appears to be: feminist critique, if it wants to make its points, cannot do without the power of argument. I agree, and am sure that other feminists mentioned by Walby such as Braidotti and Haraway, would agree too, as would Habermas and Foucault (if they read Feminist Theory). The second message seems to be: feminist epistemology beware; to acknowledge the contextual dimension of knowledge is necessary and good, in principle, but mind the gaps of relativism, don't be self-refuting. I agree with that, too, but the difficulties start shortly after this. The third message is: essentialist identity politics are problematic for their tendency of reifying differences. It is better to aim for a transformative politics that integrates perspectives on equality and difference, acknowledgement and distribution, and changes the system which defines current inequalities and differences.
The three messages, with which I agree in general, appear quite entangled with one another, and yet they do not seem much connected by argumentwhich led me to join and challenge Sylvia Walby with a hyper-Habermasian headline: More Power to Argument (which should be complemented by a Foucauldian memento: and never forget about the argument of power). But in spite of a certain sympathy with the general direction of the messages, I ended up with a critical assessment. This includes the theoretical framework of the text as a whole, as well as the development and details of Walby's argument. My comments are meant to pay tribute to Walby's intentions, as I understand them, by asking for more explication than she gives and by trying to pick up some of her arguments to carry them further than she does.
Either/or traps
Problems in the architecture of the text concern the somewhat unclear interconnection between epistemological questions, questions of moral philosophy/political theory and practical politics which recur in the inconsistent use of notions of 'difference'. Since it is impossible to discuss all the problematics in detail, I focus primarily on two interlinked aspects. In the first two sections I will take up Walby's analytical use of the notion of 'argument' in contrast to 'power' and 'location'. Later I shall take a look at concepts of 'difference' and the debates on social justice.
The scenario Walby unfolds is flanked by two names that seem to mark alternative camps: Michel Foucault for positions that tend to equate power and knowledge on the one hand, and Jürgen Habermas as advocate of the modern values of rational argumentation on the other. This set-up invites a repetition of problems that we witnessed in the endless pro-and condebates following Habermas' attack on Foucault in the 1980s. A polarizing dramaturgy certainly can be of use for a pointed argument -but its success
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Feminist Theory 1(2) very much depends on being theoretically to the point, otherwise it can easily turn into a trap. After all, both authors have written important texts on the close interconnections between power and knowledge, and both have taken up questions concerning contemporary critical theory. The crucial point of divergence is the normative founding of critique and the securing of a universalist horizon of some kind. While Habermas undertakes such a proceduralist reconstruction of basic categories of social critique from within a post-metaphysical tradition, combining insights from diverse disciplines, Foucault is more interested in the question of the particular historical forces which prevail and hide in the rise of universalist thought since the late 18th century. He rejects the possibility and necessity of reconstructing universal norms -be it in the realm of theoretical or practical reason. Foucauldian critique has not been very explicit about its own normative backgrounds (Fraser, 1989) , but it sharply reflects the functioning of normativity. Although in his later work Foucault approached questions of different forms of communicating truth-claims (Foucault, 1996) , this, too, is not aimed at founding epistemic or other norms. Thus, in the context of Foucault's work, argumentation has a completely different conceptual status than in Habermas' thought. Instead of structuring the discussion on feminist theories of knowledge along the lines of unspecified notions of power versus argumentation, as Walby does, it would seem more appropriate first to determine the pertinent divergencies between both positions and then, against that background, to reconstruct the ways feminist theories and epistemologies either repeat or try to overcome them.
The international discussion about the limits and possibilities of postmetaphysical ways of a philosophical grounding of social criticism, the questioning of overarching epistemes, of unifying meta-discourses and the fate of 'difference' under the normative weight of these regulations forms the wider background of the feminist discourse Sylvia Walby's article deals with.
In order to locate more precisely some of the problems that arise in the article, I shall reconstruct one current of this debate that connects to Habermas and the systematic status of his notion of argumentation, as well as to Nancy Fraser's position, and even to standpoint epistemologies. The line of social criticism I refer to leads back to a left-Hegelian and then Marxist tradition that has continued via Lucacz, Horkheimer to Habermas and others, and that has influenced feminist debates too. Critical theory in this understanding has a twofold task: 'to critically illuminate the great historical changes of the twentieth century, and to self-reflexively ground its own critique as an historical possibility. It is, in that sense, emphatically contextual -a self-reflexive theory of historical context' (Postone, 1999: 26) .
This self-reflexive figure marks a genuine difference in comparison with other types of social criticism. One highly contested issue in contemporary debates is where to locate such conditions of possibility of critique in present-day society. Can they be anchored within the grounds of a widened notion of rationality as Habermas suggests -in order to avoid an overly Knapp: More power to argument 209 radical and thus self-refuting critique of reason as he sees it represented in Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and even, wrongly as I believe, in Adorno (Rademacher, 1997; Thyen, 1989) ? Can the normative criteria of critique be secured, as Honneth thinks, by developing a theory of acknowledgement which tries to get closer to actual experiences of discrimination and injustice than Habermas' linguistic formal pragmatics allows for (Honneth, 1995) ? Or how plausible is Nancy Fraser's political-pragmatic understanding, that refers to the critical potential represented in contemporary social movements, as does Seyla Benhabib in Critique, Norm and Utopia (1986)? It is this task of a self-reflexive grounding of critique that motivated Habermas to turn from epistemology to a theory of communicative rationality and, along with this, to argumentation. I do not want to overestimate Walby's actual reliance on Habermas, but since the many silences in her article make it difficult to clarify her intentions, I let myself be guided by the emphasis of her references. If these references are meant to be more than an authorizing name-dropping, the mentioned names and theories they stand for must affect her line of argumentation. When she uses the notion of 'argument' by referring to Habermas, does she share its theoretical embedding or does she just pick it up instrumentally? How does she respond to Habermas' relativizing of the relevance of epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie) for social criticism? After all, her article centres quite strongly on epistemology.
'Argumentation' in Habermas' work is inseparable from his 'rational reconstructing' of the general preconditions of communicative action, the formal pragmatics of language use and the normative potential of claims connected with different types of speech acts. He distinguishes several types of argumentation (theoretical discourse, practical discourse, aesthetic criticism, therapeutic critique, explicative discourse), problematic expressions (cognitive-instrumental, moral, practical, evaluative, expressive) and controversial validity claims connected to them (truth of propositions/efficacy of teleological actions, rightness of norms of action, adequacy of standards of value, truthfulness or sincerity of expressions, comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs) (Habermas, 1994) . A complex view of the principles of communicative rationality as they evolve in the different spheres of communicative action seems central in the context of his paradigm of mutual understanding, with which Habermas hopes to overcome the pitfalls of mentalism he sees represented in the philosophy of the subject.
Habermas' counterpart in Walby's stage-setting, Foucault, has no theory of argumentation of this kind. Yet argumentation indirectly plays a role in his discursive praxeology, where it would be linked systematically to concepts of power struggles, to dispute and conflict rather than to counterfactual constructions of ideal speech-situations and ideals of consensus (Foucault, 1996) . Criteria for what can count as true, right, good, authentic, rational cannot be gained from a position outside the historical constellations of power and norms, including scientific norms. Neither can they for Habermas, but he wants to explore general preconditions for their rational justification on a meta-theoretical level of conceptual analysis.
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A certain avoidance of being specific affects not only the quality of Walby's critique, but also the theoretical accountability of her own position. In an inverted way this avoidance shows even when she distances herself from Habermas:
My defence of Habermas against Foucault does not, however, extend to a full acceptance of Habermas' position on all matters. Nevertheless, his work is important in demonstrating that there are philosophical alternatives to the reduction of knowledge to power that is so often understood to be the legacy of Foucault's work. (Walby, 2000: 194) Bearing in mind the Bauhaus-type architecture of Habermas' theory, his highly systematic founding and interlinking of pieces of argumentation, to ask to be informed about the aspects Walby rejects in Habermas is not a question of mere curiosity. Which of Habermas' positions on which matters would Walby reject and why? Is it his adoption of systems theory in place of the western Marxist social theory of his Frankfurt school teachers, which leaves the core dynamics of capitalist economy unquestioned? Is it the anchoring of his universal pragmatics in a sociological theory of evolution, his replacing of a psychoanalytic theory of the subject by notions borrowed from cognitive psychology? Is it the highly counterfactual dimension of his discourse ethics or is it the rationalist implications of Habermas' theory altogether, which have attracted critiques and revisions even from his closest theoretical allies? Answers to all of these questions could and should be related to the discussion of 'argumentation' in order to assess the latter's theoretical and political possibilities.
There lurks another problematic in Walby's reference to Habermas: looking at the importance of theories of knowledge and epistemology in her text, one would expect her to discuss the fact that for Habermas the paradigmatic shift to communication and argumentation is accompanied by a strong relativization of epistemology as the via regia of critique. Walby, however, does not qualify her reference to epistemology and her understanding of it. It seems that she is quite unaware of the implications of the paradigmatic shift in Habermas, who has stated on several occasions that after Knowledge and Human Interest (1971) he gave up on basing critical social theory on epistemology. From the early 1980s onwards he analyzed the formal pragmatic preconditions of communicative action in general. It is only in his most recent studies on political theory, which -as far as I know -have not yet been translated into English, that Habermas returns to epistemological questions in the context of a revision of his discoursetheoretical notion of truth which tends to idealize the process of argumentation and does not do justice to the normative specificity of truth-claims in comparison with other normative claims. After all, consensus is not the same as truth, however ideal the formal conditions for argumentation may be (Habermas, 1999) .
It is a petitio principii to presuppose the rational capacity of argument and yet not to reflect on the problem of what is convincing in validity claims. What forms the consensual potential and binding dimension of argument with respect to controversial claims like the standards of value, Knapp: More power to argument 211 the rightness of norms of actions, the truth of positions? Walby mentions 'everyday rationality' and 'evidence' -but is it not exactly the problem of conditions of possibility of both that is central to the wider epistemological discussions to which she refers? Alternative positions are not presented. She criticizes feminists like Rosi Braidotti or Donna Haraway for not answering the question of how knowledge claims can be assessed, but then, neither does Walby herself -unless one wishes to read her hint to Nelson 'who argues that pieces of knowledge can always be used to assess each other ' (2000: 193) as an answer. She praises procedural rationality in the most general terms, while Habermas, reacting to critiques, warned against concretist linkings of procedural rationality to practical problems as early as 1989. Criteria of procedural rationality function with respect to only one universal aspect, for example claims of justice or rightness. But we cannot judge, as he says, life forms or life histories by these criteria. Life forms do not consist of institutions which can be judged by criteria of justice, but they consist of language games, historical constellations of habitualized practices, group memberships, cultural representations, etc. It would make no sense to judge such a totality by singular aspects of rationality. For Habermas, there are no substantive standards which would allow answers to questions such as what constitutes a 'good' life via some formal notion of rationality (Habermas, 1989) . Since theorists like Seyla Benhabib have critically taken up this problematic from a feminist perspective, it would have been possible for Walby to develop the way she took up Habermas by contrasting it with Benhabib's reservations against his rationalism.
The return of persuasion
Two further points of criticism can be made with respect to Walby's article: she tends to construct positions in an exaggerated and homogenizing way and then criticizes them for being exaggerated and homogenizing; and in posing a problem she tends to be so very general, sometimes inconsistent, that the specific differences between positions seem to disappear. Thus she herself relies more on persuasion than on argument. Her section on theories of knowledge might serve as an example. Here she discusses feminist positions along the power/knowledge distinction and the assumed parochialisms of locality. She starts out by stating that politics of difference are often underpinned by a standpoint epistemology in which knowledge is relative to social position (this, it should be added, is not only true of standpoint epistemologies). Forms of knowledge and values are supposed to be considered so diverse among communities as to be incommensurable. Who, of all feminist theorists, would defend such a philosophically and sociologically undifferentiated particularism in epistemological debates today? Feminist criticism has rightly attacked the supposedly objective 'view from nowhere' of modern science, but instead of embracing the indifferent 'dream of everywhere' (Bordo) of uncritical currents of postmodernism, a typical feature of feminist theory is exactly its high awareness of the tension between situated critique and generalized validity claims. To me it seems that this tension is at the center of the debate. To claim a 'view from
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Feminist Theory 1 (2) somewhere' does not automatically imply an understanding of language games as narrow, univocal and homogeneous fields of meaning, as Walby seems to suggest (Benhabib, 1993; Klinger, 1998) . Instead of outlining the positions she has in mind and commenting on their relevance in contemporary debates, Walby jumps straight away into another polarizing set-up.
How does one read conjunctions like the following: 'The politics of location draws on an alleged specificity of knowledge production in different social locations (Braidotti, 1991 (Braidotti, , 1992 (Braidotti, , 1994 . However, there are alternative epistemologies. It has long been argued that science is not a mirror of nature (Rorty, 1980) . . . . .' (Walby, 2000: 190) . There follows a long list of diverse authors representing quite controversial positions in the contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology, forcibly united by one single aspect they share with almost everyone since Kant: a critique of naive realism.
Again it seems more for general rhetorical reasons that Walby refers to this colourful list:
These insights are not unique to poststructuralism, but rather have been the orthodoxy in the philosophy and sociology of science for many decades. . . . Poststructuralists re-articulate this longstanding issue in the philosophy of science, of the theory-ladenness of observations, using new vocabularies which focus on the way that language mediates experience. (2000: 191) Then her argument takes a new direction:
The epistemological issue at stake in the politics of location is not whether we can naively discover the world by looking hard, but rather, given that our knowledge is inevitably constructed through a socially mediated process, what the implications of this are for methods of analysis. There are divergent views on how to address this position, and the politics of location is but one of these. (2000: 191) It may well be that Walby here refers to a context of debate which is not as strongly developed in German-speaking feminism -the reasons for which would be an interesting task to explore. Maybe she reacts to the 'post-istic' gesture in parts of the broader 'postmodern' discourse, signalling a widespread urge to reinvent the wheel (Derrida, 1997) . If it is this trend Walby opposes in her article, then she has good reasons to remind her addressees that poststructuralism was not the first to criticize naive realism. However, the way she does it seems somehow insufficient with reference to the feminist positions she discusses. Rather than resorting to an unspecific variety of authors and setting this up in opposition to poststructuralism (as such) it would have been more useful to reconstruct the backgrounds of positions Walby's text actually deals with: especially the concept of a 'politics of location' formulated by Rosi Braidotti (1994) , which refers to a theoretical genealogy quite different from Donna Haraway's concept of 'situated knowledge' (Becker-Schmidt, 1998; Haraway, 1988; Weber, 1998) .
For a more detailed comparison Walby could have taken up the framework Benhabib offers in 'Feminism and Postmodernity ' (1993) where she comments on the long history of criticism of the classical episteme of (1971) . Using different arguments they demonstrate that, for historical, cultural and psychological reasons, the epistemic subject cannot gain full transparency, but it can reflect the way it has been constituted by the forces of history and society. Most of the critical standpoint epistemologies, including feminist versions, refer to this theoretical tradition.
The second line of critique is connected with the names of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment) and is in close proximity to the early Foucault. The episteme of modernity in this context is viewed as an episteme of domination. As Adorno and Horkheimer have argued in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, it is 'concept' (Begriff), the unit of thought in the western tradition, which enforces homogeneity and identity upon the heterogeneity of the material (Benhabib, 1995: 227) . The third line of critique goes back to Peirce and Saussure, later worked out by Frege, Wittgenstein and others. Peirce and Saussure start out by stating that there is no natural relation between signifier and signified. Consequently, the analysis of signification has to focus on processes of language use in specific contexts. Habermas with his major work, Derrida and postmodern theorists like Lyotard, all work more or less within the last line of tradition. In analytical philosophy, contemporary hermeneutics and French neo-and poststructuralism, the mentalist paradigm has been superseded by a linguistic one. Epistemology in this context does not center on an individual epistemic subject and on the contents of its consciousness, but focuses on the public processes of signification. The epistemic subject turns into an inter-subject. From within the linguistic framework epistemic subjects can be seen to exist in a community of selves who share a common horizon of interpretation (Gadamer) or language games (Wittgenstein). French neostructuralists have opted for renouncing an epistemic subject altogether. Instead they focus on language as a system and a process and analyze the effects of signification (Benhabib, 1995: 225) .
Against the background of this rough sketch extracted from Benhabib one can see that the positions Walby presents might be better compared by looking at their characteristic features and at what they have to say concerning the founding of social critique, rather than by positioning them along the strangely opposed categories of power and knowledge. For the sake of comparison it would also be necessary to specify the notion of
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Feminist Theory 1 (2) 'knowledge' and its references (e.g. knowledge production in human and natural sciences) and to relate notions of experience, which have been so important for a feminist critique of science and society, to the problematic of positively formulating something like a feminist epistemology. Walby does not meet such preconditions of 'rational argumentation'. Walby begins by introducing Foucault's work as one 'where power and knowledge are almost reduced to each other ' (2000: 190) . Later she states that 'Foucault himself drew back from equating power and knowledge ' (2000: 191) . In order to keep up her position she then translates the supposed problem of Foucault's theory into a problem of reception, of the way his intellectual legacy has been taken up. And there appears 'a' position from 'a' reading of Foucault that 'power and knowledge are so inextricably connected that they are inseparable. Power constructs its own truth, while knowledge is the basis of power' (Walby, 2000: 191) . Again the reader is left to speculate because there is no reference to any identifiable position of this kind. Are there relevant feminist readings of Foucault in this vein in the UK? If not, why present them? If yes, why not name them? Introducing this anonymous 'reading' serves well the rhetorical function of keeping up the framework of her argument; it does little to enlighten the interested reader.
Walby then compares three positions, which can be abbreviated as follows:
1. an (unqualified) position: power is knowledge; 2. standpoint epistemologies that claim a 'truer, less distorted knowledge' (Walby, 2000: 191) to be found among the least powerful; 3. an (unqualified) postmodern position that declares knowledge to be local and partial, specific to each knowledge community (she names Haraway, but rightly states that she does not really fit).
This kind of constructing by assumption cannot serve the purpose of discussion and it is not surprising that it leads to confusion. It leads, for example, to seeing contradictions where there are none: 'There is a basic contradiction between the first two positions: in the first, power is the basis on which knowledge is constructed; in the second, a lack of power is required for clear vision' (Walby, 2000: 192) . Without reconstructing the common point of reference this sounds like stating a basic contradiction between apples and pears. This argument makes sense only when one identifies knowledge with clear vision per se. It is the lack of differentiation between kinds of scientific knowledge, everyday knowledge and social experience of oppressed groups, incriminated above, which has been so important in feminist epistemology debates, that has fostered this result. Now, even if Sylvia Walby -like myself -were critical of the possibility of completely separating scientific knowledge from everyday knowledge, the conditions and the normative regulations of the respective forms of knowledge production differ and would have to be taken into account in order to be able to assess the different positions on that. Not all standpoint epistemologies claim that oppressed groups possess a less distorted knowledge, as Walby seems to suggest. Standpoint Knapp: More power to argument 215 epistemologies have come from and taken different routes and they, too, are influenced by divergent traditions of thought, from Marx and Durkheim to Mannheim. The argument that a lack of power enhances clear vision stems not from the Mannheimian current of sociology of knowledge, which has informed much of radical US sociology, but, as mentioned earlier, from the Marxist line. The Mannheimian variant is based on the premise that all knowledge (Weltanschauung) is related to the social location of the knower and implies a relational perspectivism. The pragmatic truth criterion in this tradition is the adequacy of knowledge relative to life conditions. The natural sciences are exempted from his totalized notion of ideology. The idea of a connection between a lack of power and 'clear vision' goes back to the paradigmatic model of the master-slave dialectic which grounds Hegelian-Marxist ideology critique: the master is blind, because ignoring his dependency is constitutive for keeping up his status; while the slave cannot be ignorant about his social situation. In this context the question is not one of the 'truth' of knowledge claims or 'clear vision' in scientific knowledge. It is all about the possibility of critique: at stake is the question of privileged access to understanding social conditions on the basis of social experiences of discrimination, injustice and violence. Feminist standpoint epistemologies have been inspired by both lines. Yet they should be differentiated when it comes to the question of grounding a social criticism and comparing the epistemic potential of positions, because there can be a certain tension between them. While the Mannheimian line has given up on ideology critique and has to grapple with the problem of relativism, the Marxist line bases the possibility of social criticism, including the critique of ideology, on the specific social location of experience, and has to grapple with the problem of constructing this in a way which does not itself produce ideology, e.g. reified concepts of group-specific epistemic privileges and historical teleologies of emancipation.
Walby does not explain how she understands 'knowledge', she does not tell the reader why she selected the 'clear vision' variant as representing feminist standpoint epistemology. The other variant of relational perspectivism seems quite popular, too. Indeed, Donna Haraway's work has obviously been informed by both. It is not surprising that she is difficult to fit into the categories Walby sets up. By drawing on the sociology of knowledge, Marxist standpoint epistemology, discourse theory and constructivist actor-network theories Haraway, with a creative eclecticism, combines thoughts deriving from different, even opposed, paradigms. Walby rightly states that Haraway does not explicate and justify the ethical and aesthetic norms that factually guide her writing. Yet I cannot share her critique of Haraway, Braidotti and others for uncritically affirming or overvaluing the rhetorical, the aesthetic, the narrative dimension of theory, since it relies on false alternatives.
Walby bases her objections on a defense of rational argument by referring to normal scientific procedures. Although she is right to note that 'myth, fiction, ethics and aesthetics are a very weak basis for feminist
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Feminist Theory 1 (2) knowledge claims ' (2000: 193) , her polarizing is misguided since it underestimates the rhetorical character even of crude empiricism and the beliefdimension inherent in what counts as science. I share Walby's opinion that feminist theorizing should not and cannot move outside academia, that empirical research and justified reasoning are indispensable for basing arguments. Although both Braidotti and Haraway come up with statements one could read as a call for giving up the usual modes and conventions of academic thought, neither one of them actually gives up rational theorizing and argumentation. And in the work of both authors one can also find much less radical statements on this topic. Sylvia Walby is not unaware of this but she draws different conclusions from that than I do. Braidotti's and Haraway's critique is directed against rationalism, not against rationality; it is directed against abstract universalism, not against the possibility of reflected generalizations; it calls for accountability of speakers' positions, not for affirming particularism; it attacks the strict and authoritarian segregation of genres of high theory and poetical language, but it does not call for identifying them by negating their difference -actually, the mere hope that something new emerges from mixing genres relies on keeping up at least the difference mixing presupposes. Walby's polarizing way of argumentation leads her to defend 'routine knowledge development ' (2000: 193) without further qualifications. I understand feminism as a variant of critical theory. As such it belongs to those traditions that have decisively interrogated empiricism and positivism. Critical reflections of what becomes 'scientific routine' and how these routines change in contemporary technosciences are indispensable for feminist sociologists and feminists from other disciplines as well. An awareness of ongoing developments of such 'routines' is important, since it leads to realizing the growing economic pressures and demands for types of research, theory and results designed to be utilized in socio-technological reforms. Feminist theory and research should be ready to reflect the dialectic and contradictions of such reformism it itself participates in, instead of having to embrace it by following the logic of either/or arguments. Rather, the task is to widen the collective and individual space -even in academia (and even in sociology) -for experimentation, for unorthodox constellations of theory, empirical research and different forms of representation.
Thinking through dilemmas
Although Walby claims that the nature of difference is one of the important questions her article deals with, there is no proper theoretical or empirical explanation of this concept, unless one understands the mere listing of class, 'race', ethnicity, nation, religion, linguistic community, sexual orientation, age, generation, ablebodiedness, gender as being specific. She ambivalently presupposes a notion of difference that seems coextensive with group properties, identities, local knowledges etc., then distances herself from such readings without explicating her own understanding, which leaves the reader guessing her way through the text. After all: difference 'as such' is an empty notion; it is not a substantial, but a relational Knapp: More power to argument 217 term, referring to relations of the mutual determining of categories by inand exclusions. It has often been noted that the notion of difference is theoretically complicated, because it signifies more of an absence than a substantive presence. Against the background of the diversity of uses of 'difference' in feminist theory it becomes necessary to clarify what the points of reference of notions of 'difference' are in reality/ontologically and in terms of perspective/epistemologically, and how the position one refers to configures both these dimensions. Feminist debates cover 'difference' from at least three basic perspectives which can refer to different dimensions or levels of analysis. The conceptualizing of these dimensions varies with the specific foci of theoretical positions; their heuristic potentials vary depending on whether one uses an external or an internal approach or a combination of both. Basic features of this matrix can provisionally be presented as follows:
• Perspective I: Differences between women and men (can for instance be focused on an individual, intergroup, interactional, cultural/symbolic, institutional, socio-structural or societal level of analysis -and/or on the way these respective dimensions are mediated through one another).
• Perspective II: Social differences that cut across the gender categories.
(The selection of relevant categories relies already on theoretical premises and the specific research to be carried out; it depends on whether one takes an internal or an external view. Relevant, but not exclusive, categories for social theoretical perspectives on inequality and discrimination are: class relations, 'race' relations, ethnic relations, sexual relations. They, too, can be focused along the lines of the intermediated levels mentioned above.) • Perspective III: Differences within individual subjects. (Internal differences can reflect all of the categories mentioned above, with -as especially psychoanalytic theories convincingly argue -specific relevance of sexual difference to (early) processes of subjectivation, individualization and socialization. This perspective focuses for example on dimensions of identity constraints and constructions, of intrasubjective dynamics of desires, conflicts and fears, and on subjects relating to others and fields of practice.) (For a similar scheme see Braidotti, 1994.) One remark should be added: taking into account social and cultural differences between women has been an important move in differentiating feminist theory. But, in order to be able to increase the critical potential of feminism, it seems necessary to give up the analytical concentration on women typical in the debate on 'axes of difference'. This concentration exists for historical reasons: it reflects the debates within feminism on different experiences and the diversification of the political subject of feminism. Analytically, however, focusing on the diversity of the category 'Women' only, leads into a blind alley for two connected reasons. As the notion indicates, gender relations can only be explicated by looking at relations. This is true also with reference to the other 'axes of difference': whom and what they separate and interconnect by what kinds of
218
